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1 Introduction
In a review article regarding the economics of internationally shared sheries,
Munro (2007) concludes that sheries managers are confronted with two op-
tions for nding an e¢ cient solution to the management of such stocks: either
"await the future work of applied game theorists that explore sheries issues",
or..."nish the job by eliminating the Freedom of the Seas principle and es-
tablishing defacto property rights for the charter members of sheries organi-
zations." My thesis contributes to the economics literature of internationally
shared stocks, for the second proposed solution would be a radical one for the
international legal community.
Most of the economic analysis for internationally shared sheries has fo-
cused on cooperation without side payments, and particularly in the context of
common-pool resources. Instead, I develop a theoretical framework employing
side payments in a stochastic sequentially harvested stock. The side-payments
solution, or quota transfers, has recently been allowed in the management of the
Atlantic Bluen Tuna. This mechanism is expected to be employed by other
international organizations in which shing nations do not have xed property
rights over the stock. A calibration exercise of the proposed theory is performed
in the case of the Western Atlantic Bluen Tuna shery. The goal of the cali-
bration is to derive compensation estimates that could supplement the existing
management strategies.
1
1.1 Internationally Shared Fisheries: The New Entrant
Problem
According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Na-
tions (1982, 1995, 2006)), Coastal States have the property right to exclusively
harvest their marine resources within 200 nautical miles from the coast, into
an area called Exclusive Economic Zone1 ; stocks found beyond the 200 nautical
miles limit, into the sea zone called Adjacent High Sea, are subject to exploita-
tion by any country, Coastal State or not. The Adjacent High Sea is considered
international waters. Non Coastal States operating in international waters are
called Distant Water Fishing Nations.
Fisheries economists follow marine biologists in distinguishing among 3 classes
of stocks that move across sea boundaries: transboundary, highly migratory, and
straddling. Transboundary are the resources that move across two (or more)
Exclusive Economic Zones; highly migratory those (mainly the tuna species)
traveling from one Exclusive Economic Zone to the Adjacent High Sea; and
straddling all the remaining species (other than the anadromous and catadro-
mous2) found both in the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Adjacent High Sea.
There is not a clear economic, or even biological, justication for distinguish-
ing between highly migratory and straddling stocks (Munro, 2011). The three
classes are non-mutually exclusive, and the terminology seems to have been
revised from time to time.
1Property rights of Coastal States were not clearly dened in the early 80s, when the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was signed. The vagueness of the Con-
ventions Article 64 allowed some nations, mainly the US, to conveniently misinterpret the
Coastal States rights regarding one category of internationally shared species: the US was
pushing for an interpretation according to which Coastal States would not be granted prop-
erty rights to the portion of highly migratory stocks found within Coastal StatesExclusive
Economic Zones. Nevertheless, this interpretation was nally not adopted.
2Anadromous are the species that spawn in fresh water, migrate to the sea for most of
their life, and return to fresh water in order to spawn and die. Catadromous species follow
the opposite route, and are less important commercially. Some important anadromous species
in North America are the Pacic Salmon, the Atlantic Sturgeon, and the Atlantic Stripped
Bass ("Rocksh", in the Chesapeake Bay area); the Atlantic Eel is a catadromous species.
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Problems of overexploitation of internationally shared stocks emerged in
the late 80s. The extension of sheries jurisdiction up to 200 nautical miles
turned out to be an ine¢ cient policy. The reason is that policy makers (in
their majority, at that point, marine biologists and international lawyers) had
failed to consider what economists would have pointed out in the rst place,
i.e., behavioral adjustments (or the Le-Châtelier Principle).3 What happened
was that once Coastal States extended sheries jurisdiction, the newly excluded
Distant Water Fishing Nations responded by reallocating their e¤ort to species
unattractive until that time; the pressure simply shifted from coastal sheries to
straddling ones. Changing jurisdiction was intended to reduce overexploitation
of Coastal species, but simply shifted overexploitation to internationally shared
stocks.
Two well-known examples of overexploitation of internationally shared stocks
in North America are the Grand Bank Groundsh stock o¤ Newfoundland, and
the Pollock shery in Alaska. Overexploitation of the Grand Bank Groundsh
stock, by Canadians and Spanish trawlers, resulted in a serious diplomatic con-
ict in 1992. After Canada implemented the 200 nautical miles boundary for
its Exclusive Economic Zone, two segments of the Grand Bank (known as the
"Nose" and the "Tail" of the Bank) were left in the Adjacent High Sea; there,
the stock was open to exploitation by both Canada and the EU. Regarding the
Alaskan Pollock shery, harvests in the "Doughnut hole" (an area between the
US and the Russian Exclusive Economic Zones in Alaska) were limited, until
1984, to less than 4,000 tons per year. By 1988, total harvests had reached 1,6
million tons. In 1992, US, Russia and a group of Distant Water Fishing Nations
agreed upon a moratorium.
3Another example in sheries management in which the economists insights have been
proven correct, is in the full resource utilization criterion. The central management criterion
employed in the past by marine biologists was maximization of sustainable yields; however,
this criterion does not nd support in economic theory, for it pays attention only to the
production (not cost) side of the problem. Economists helped abandoning this criterion.
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As a response to the crisis in internationally shared stocks, the United Na-
tions decided, in the early 90s, to manage such stocks through Regional Fish-
eries Management Organizations (hereafter, for brevity, Organizations). These
Organizations are coalitions of cooperating countries. Overall, the management
through Organizations has been unsuccessful. For instance, the United Na-
tions estimated that, by 2006, approximately 2/3 of all internationally shared
stocks, and specically 1/2 of the worlds tuna resources, had been depleted
(FAO (2007)). In the US sheries specically, the Atlantic Salmon has been
listed as an endangered species since 2000; while the moratorium on the Central
Bering Pollock shery has been in place since 1992 (NOAA (2011)). McKelvey
et al. (2002) argue that Organizations, overall, may create a very destructive
environment for the stock.
The main reason why Organizations have been unable to provide a sat-
isfactory solution to the management of internationally shared stocks is free
riding4 . Explicit free riding arises when a group of cooperating countries is
unable to deter non-compliance (i.e., cannot impose severe penalties to those
breaching the agreement), and when the group cannot deter non-participation.
Non-participation occurs when a signatory decides to depart from a coalition5 ,
or when an outsider remains a non-signatory; therefore, depleting the stock in
international waters. Barrett (2005) nds that, in any type of international
agreements, deterring non-participation is more di¢ cult than deterring non-
compliance.6
4Other than dealing with the problem of free riding, Munro (2001) gives another issue that
needs to be resolved when forming coalitions. In the simplest case in which an Organization
consists of a single Coastal State and a Distant Water Fishing Nation, the two countries need
to agree on a bottom-up or top-down management approach. In the former, the preferences
of the Coastal State regarding the management of the stock dominate those of the Distant
Water Fishing Nation; while the opposite holds in the top-down approach.
5 In practice, shing nations are allowed to exit from coalitions after giving a short notice,
typically of less than 12 months, to the Organizations.
6Also, Barretts (1994) words capture well the explicit free-riding problem appearing in any
international agreement: "the more countries agree to cooperate, the higher their collective
benets, but the higher also their incentives to free ride."
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Moreover, free riding in sheries can be implicit. It is implicit when a previ-
ously non-participating shing nation decides to accede to a coalition; therefore,
reaping some of the cooperative rewards. This new entrant problemmakes any
benets from cooperation ephemeral. If the number of participants in Organi-
zations could be held somehow constant, then the new entrant problem would
no longer exist.
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1.2 Current Management Practices
Organizations try to deter free-riding by threatening with trade restrictions/import
bans7 . Overall, such threats have had limited success in the past, and their ef-
ciency has been controversial.8 The reason why, in practice, import bans have
been largely ine¤ective is that vessels (engaging in Illegal, Unreported and Un-
regulated shing9) can evade them by simply transferring activities to other
countries (the latter called ags of convenience, or open registers10).
In practice, Organizations lack the legal power to remove a nations right
from harvesting in international waters; and therefore, address the implicit free
riding problem. Instead, they are obliged to give a "just and reasonable" allo-
cation of the resource to any nation "with a real interest in it" (UN (1994)).
Problems also arise in dealing with explicit free-riding, because vessels are best
regarded as mobile pockets of sovereignty in international waters; no State
-other than their Flag States- can exercise jurisdiction over them. Even when
7The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas was the rst Or-
ganization to ever impose such measures: in 1996, trade restrictions were imposed to Belize,
and in 1999, to Equitorial Guinea; in both cases regarding imports of bluen tuna. Neverthe-
less, these restrictions were lifted in 2002 and 2004, respectively. As of 2010, the Commission
maintains sanctions to Bolivia and Georgia, regarding Bigeye tuna.
8McKelvey et al. (2003) discuss, in an economic context, the positive and negative economic
consequences arising from the threat of barrier impositions.
9The term Ilegal, Unreported and Unregulated shing was established by the Commis-
sion on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. This Commission desrves
mentioning because it was the rst one, to my knowledge, to implement an "ecosystem man-
agement approach", when the focus, in other Organizations, was on regulating single species.
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources came into force
in 1982, with a view to protecting all marine life in the Southern Ocean (excluding whales
and seals, which are managed according to the International Convention for the Regulation
of Whaling, and the Convention for the Conservation of the Antarctic Seals).
10An open register imposes no nationality, or citizenship requirements, on those ying its
ag. The owners of vessels in an open registry are not required to have any assets in the ag
state; therefore, prosecution (and recovery of damages) becomes very di¢ cult. The largest
open registries are maintained by Panama, Liberia, Bahamas, Malta, Cyprus and Bermuda;
other popular countries with open registries are Bolivia, Belize, Panama, and Uruguay. More-
over, "landlocked" countries, such as the Slovak Republic, and Mongolia, also o¤er open reg-
istries (the Singapore-based administrators of Mongolias register advertise competitive fees,
no restrictions on crew nationality, and no taxes in order to issue registrations within the
hour). As a response to the "success" of open registers, several of the traditional maritime
countries (including Netherlands, Germany, Norway, and the UK) have now set up their own
second registers, o¤ering more benecial arrangements to ship owners.
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a vessel violates laws inside another countrys Exclusive Economic Zone, penal-
ties against foreign nationals cannot include imprisonment (the arrested vessel
and crew have to be released on a reasonable bond); and evidence needs to be
gathered in order to launch a case11 .
In summary, the role of Organizations is limited to encouraging the set-
tlement of disputes through peaceful means, and making recommendations to
cooperating parties.
Recommendations have historically taken di¤erent forms. The initial prac-
tice of setting non-abundance-based catch limits has proven unsuccessful, es-
pecially in sheries with signicant variations in the spawning biomass across
time12 . A well known example in which cooperation (between Canada and the
US) collapsed due to an unforeseen climatic shift is the Pacic Salmon (Miller
et al. (2000, 2004))13 .
Today, nearly all Organizations have switched to abundance-based catch
limits, i.e., catch limits that take into account the scientistsbest assessment of
the state of the stock. Nevertheless, it still remains a question whether catch
adjustments are frequent (and accurate enough) to reect the real conditions of
the stocks.
A third type of arrangement adopted in specic sheries is reciprocal har-
11There are examples of vessels operating illegally in Australia and the Southern Pacic
that destroyed evidence prior to being arrested, even to the extent of throwing logbooks,
computers, papers, and navigation equipment overboard.
12There is a vast biological literature on the e¤ects of natural warming-cooling cycles on
sheries, called Pacic Decadal Oscillation, North Atlantic Oscillation and El-Niño Southern
Oscillation (see, for instance, Beamish et al. (2004), Vilchis et al. (2005), Perry et al. (2005),
Cook and Heath (2005)). Less information is available regarding the impact of anthropogenic
climate change on sheries (see, for instance, Bakun (1990), Bakun and Weeks (2004)).
13The history of the Pacic Salmon agreements goes back to 1930, when the US and Canada
signed the Fraser Treaty. This treaty was revised in 1971 and 1985, but cooperation broke
down in 1993 due to climate-induced changes in the migration patterns of salmon. In 1999,
after 6 years of negotiations (during which the US delegation team had to reconcile her internal
di¤erences, i.e., di¤erences in the interests of the continental US shers and the Alaskan US
shers), the two countries decided to sign another amendment. The main lesson from this
shery to policy makers was that conicts could have been prevented if national quotas were
abundance-based.
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vesting. This arrangement allows one party to access anothers territory, in
exchange of granting reciprocal rights to harvest. In practice, reciprocal har-
vesting comes with two main drawbacks: rst, it requires constant monitoring
of every partys activities; and second, shers oppose to the idea of allowing
foreigners deplete their national stock. Some examples of reciprocal harvesting
are the 1981 and 2002 Canada-US Pacic Albacore Tuna Treaties, the 2005
EU-Norway Blue Whiting Treaty, and the 2006 EU-Russia Baltic Sea Treaty.
A "weaker" -to my mind- form of reciprocal harvesting, called Fisheries
Partnership Agreement, has emerged during the last decade, where this was
possible. It is "weaker" in the sense that the party "opening up" its territory
requests monetary compensation, not reciprocal rights to harvest14 . It was
possible where African shing nations were involved (the EU typically being
the other "partner"15).
Table 1 summarizes the main international sheries Organizations by type of
policy arrangement, i.e., the use of abundance-based catch limits, or reciprocal
harvesting (in its traditional, or "weak" form).
14The term "weaker" is not used formally in the literature; instead, it is my substitute for
what some countries call "Partnership". The latter gives the impression that these countries
have come up with some new type of arrangement; in reality, what they have found is simply
a less demanding "partner".
15 In May 2011, the European Commissioner for Maritime A¤airs announced her intentions
to continue Fisheries Partnership initiatives with a number of African nations. Previous such
arrangements were established with countries such as Mozambique, Morocco, Gabon, Cape
Verde, and Mauritania. Surprisingly, the EUs 1997 and 2007 arrangements (regarding blue
whiting) with the Faroe Islands, a territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, were not of this
nature; instead, they were pure reciprocal harvesting.
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1.3 Previous Economic Analysis
Any of the previous recommendations, abundance, or non-abundance-based
catch limits, reciprocal harvesting, in either form, is reached after extensive
bargaining. Even countries with a long experience in sheries policies have had
problems in reaching agreements in the past16 . Analytically, the economics of
internationally shared sh resources take elements from Bargaining (Cooper-
ative, but mainly Non-Cooperative) Theory, and (Non-Cooperative) Coalition
Theory.
The early literature, mainly developed by Munro (1979, 1987, 1990), was lim-
ited to Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Games with just two players, following
Nash (1950, 1951, 1953). This literature explains the three main issues upon
which the negotiating parties have to agree: the allocation of harvest shares, the
optimal joint harvest rates over time, and the implementation of the agreement.
Munro (1979) argues that the second of the above issues is perhaps the
toughest to be resolved in sheries. The reason is that Coastal States will
typically have di¤erent technology/harvest costs, perceptions of discount rates,
and consumer tastes. If the two negotiating parties were identical in technology
and consumer tastes, then the issue of deciding on the optimal joint policy would
no longer exist; the equilibrium joint biomass, the equilibrium joint harvest, and
the time path to these values would be calculated as in the single agent shery
dynamic problem (Clark and Munro (1975)17).
16For instance, the Canada-US Pacic Hake Treaty was signed in 2003, following a long-
standing disagreement since the early 90s; while the International Commission for the Con-
servation of the Southern Bluen Tuna was established after 9 years of negotiations (by
Australia, Japan and New Zealand).
17Clark and Munro (1975) solve the single shery dynamic problem (based on the Schaefer
model) as an autonomous (innitely elastic demand for harvested sh and constant over time
cost of e¤ort) and linear (in the control variable) optimal control problem. The steady state
biomass and harvest levels are described by the so-called "Fundamental Equation of Fisheries
Economics" (which is a Modied Golden Rule Equation of capital theory), i.e., the resources
rate of return equals the social discount rate. The time path to these equilibrium values (for
linear optimal control problems) is the most rapid one ("bang-bang").
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The main conclusions from the early literature are two: rst, side pay-
ments facilitate the resolution of conicts (compared to cooperation without
transfers)18 ; and second, non-cooperation does not guarantee overexploitation
(Munro, 2001; Bjørndal et al., 2000), but leads to outcomes signicantly infe-
rior to those achieved under cooperation (i.e., similar to a Prisoners Dilemma
Game)19 . The ine¢ ciency of the non-cooperative solution was also shown (fol-
lowing a di¤erent approach) by Levhari and Mirman (1980)20 .
The analysis becomes more elaborate by having more than two countries
involved in the game. Kaitala and Munro (1997) discuss two solutions for ad-
dressing the new entrant (i.e., implicit free riding) problem: the transferable
membership, and the waiting period solution. In the former, a new country be-
comes a member of the Organization only if a charter member rst relinquishes
its share; in the latter, new entrants have to go through a waiting period, before
start getting a share of the cooperative surplus (this reduces the payo¤s of the
prospective new members, but does not necessarily change their decision to en-
ter the shery). Both solutions, however, are based on the assumption that the
charter members of an Organization get defacto property rights of the resource.
In the late 90s, sheries economists started employing some of the advances
of Game Theory, and particularly the Characteristic- and Partition-function
approach. Games in sheries employing the Characteristic-function approach
(Kaitala and Lindroos (1998), Li (1998)21) focus on coalition formation by more
18Munro (1979) explains, rst analytically (i.e., provides a Modied Golden Rule Equation),
and then graphically, the optimal policy without transfers. He then compares this policy to
the "compromise harvest" policy with side payments. The latter results in one country paying
the other to completely stop her activities; it is as if the resource was managed by a sole owner.
19 In most cases, some sort of cooperation is necessary. There is only one in which the non-
cooperative equilibrium coincides with the cooperative one: when the e¢ cient party excludes
the opponent from the shery by operating at its monopolistic optimal steady state escapement
level. Hannesson (1995) calls this "fake cooperation".
20Fischer and Mirman (1996) extend Levhari and Mirman (1980) in the case of interacting
species.
21Li (1998) discusses the fair sharing solution to the new entrant problem. Contrary to
Kaitala and Munro (1997), Li recognizes that new members can always enter an Organization;
every time this happens, all countries renegotiate on the harvests shares from the grand
10
than two harvesting nations; in these games, nevertheless, the number of players
is xed. Games in sheries employing the Partition-function Games (Yi (1997),
Pintassilgo (2003), Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2008))22 , examine cooperation in
a more realistic setting, i.e., with a non-xed number of players.
The main conclusion from the Partition function literature is that the grand
coalition with positive externalities (to the outsiders) can rarely be an equilib-
rium outcome; "the only equilibrium which is stable (in games characterized by
positive externalities, and with more than 2 players) is the coalition structure
formed by singletons" (Pintassilgo and Lindroos (2008)). Kwon (2006), in an
extension of Levhari and Mirmans (1980) approach, also nds that coalitions
of more than two shing countries cannot be sustained over time.
The above ndings by sheries economists are rather pessimistic regarding
the prospects of cooperation in straddling stocks. Nevertheless, this conclusion is
not a big surprise, for it ts into a more general and ongoing debate among envi-
ronmental economists and game theorists, namely whether the grand coalition,
or small groups of coalitions, prevail in problems with international (positive
or negative) externalities (Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Funaki and Yamato
(1999), Chander and Tulkens (1997))23 .
coalition. The fair sharing rule means that each countrys benets from cooperation depend
on the countrys contribution towards the benets of the grand coalition. The important
assumption in Lis analysis is that all members of the grand coalition are able to agree on a
binding solution. This assumption takes care of the question how small countries (who would
be receiving, according to the fair sharing rule, a small share of the benets of the grand
coalition) could be prevented from reneging on the nal agreement.
22Yi (1997) was the rst one to introduce externalities in the theory of coaltion formation
by having a two stage game: in the rst stage (called simultaneous move open membership
game), each country (out of a nite number of players) decides whether to become a member of
the Organization or not. In the second stage, the nonmembers act individually as singletons;
while the members of the formed coalitions maximise their cooperative payo¤s given the entire
coalition structure (i.e., given the behavior of the rest of the players in other coaltions). In
the second stage, a value is assigned to each coalition through a partition function; and the
payo¤s of each coaltion depend on the entire coalition structure.
Pintassilgo (2003) follows Yis analysis, but does not make Yis assumption of symmetric
players.
23Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) show that agreements in problems of transfrontier pollution
have two common characteristics: partial cooperation, and self-nanced transfers. The au-
thors conclude that partial cooperation, in either of its 4 forms (stable coalition commitment,
sequential commitment, full cooperation minimum commitment, external commitment), could
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1.4 The Side-Payments Solution
1.4.1 Side Payments in Theory
Though most of the economic analysis examines cooperation without side pay-
ments, several authors have pointed out the superiority of policies with transfers.
The reason why side payments are, in theory, preferred to cooperation without
transfers, is that side payments focus on the allocation of the net economic ben-
ets, instead of just harvests24 . Munro (1979) was the rst to conclude that
side payments (his Compensation Principle) facilitate the resolution of conicts.
Implicit in Munros analysis is the assumption that completely "buying-out" an-
other country is politically acceptable. Clarke and Munro (1987, 1991) develop
side payments between two countries, assuming that one of the parties is the
sole harvester of the resource25 . Laukkanen (2003) argues in favor of side pay-
ments in a stochastic sequential shery26 , but nally examines a trigger stock
agreement without transfers27 . McKelvey (1997) is the only one who discusses
lead to wider coalitions.
Funaki and Yamato (1999) show that the expectations of those contemplating to form a
coalition, regarding the behavior of the outsiders (of the coalition), are critical for having the
coalition formed or not: when the expectations are pessimistic (i.e., when everyone believes
that the outsiders will act as singletons), then the grand coalition is formed (the tragedy of
the commons is avoided); when the expectations are optimistic, then the grand coalition, most
likely, does not form.
Chander and Tulkens (1997), similar to Funaki and Yamato (1999), nd that full coopera-
tion can be achieved ("the grand coalition belongs to the -core of the game"), when everyone
believes that the outsiders will play as singletons (and maximize their utilities) in the event
that the coalition breaks up.
24Economic benets include the side payments.
25Clarke and Munro (1987, 1991) explore theoretically a form of weak reciprocal harvesting
(under the assumption of perfect enforcement). The authors develop a Principal-Agent prob-
lem for a highly migratory stock, and specically the part of the stock that falls within the
Coastal States Exclusive Economic Zone. Clarke and Munro (1987) develop the analysis un-
der the assumption that the two parties have the same discount rate; their subsequent paper
(1991) relaxes this assumption. The objective of the Principal (Coastal State) is maximization
of tax revenues (taxes imposed on catches and shing e¤ort); the objective of the Agent (Dis-
tant Water Fishing Nation) is to maximize net revenues from harvesting the resource solely
in the Principals Exclusive Economic Zone.
26A "sequential" shery as opposed to a "common pool" resource (a common pool shery
is harvested simultaneously by many countries).
27Laukkanen (2003) extends Hannessons (1995) analysis to a stochastic shery. She calcu-
lates a critical amount of recruitment, above which parties cooperate, and below which, they
revert to competition for some time period.
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cooperative equilibria with side payments, specically in the context of a sequen-
tial shery (Hannesson (1995) discusses also the case of a sequential shery, but
without side payments28). However, McKelveys analysis is preliminary, in the
sense that he does not nd a solution for the optimal compensation scheme as a
function of some variable, and treats the problem only in a static framework29 .
My thesis contributes to the economics of internationally shared sheries by
developing a more comprehensive theoretical framework for cooperation with
side payments in a stochastic sequential shery. The analysis extends to a dy-
namic setting. The stochastic sequential shery is similar to that in Laukkanen
(2003).
Estimating side payments in a stochastic sequential shery (instead of a
common-pool setting), shifts the economics to the world of Moral Hazard mod-
els: the amount of stock that one country leaves unharvested becomes recruit-
ment to the other; nevertheless, recruitment is a noisy signal of the rst countrys
(unobservable) harvesting behavior due to some environmental variability.
Before proceeding with the theoretical framework, the following Section dis-
cusses how ready policy makers are to adopt side payments in practice.
1.4.2 Side Payments in Practice
The evolution of institutions supporting cooperation in sheries depends on
several economic parameters30 (e.g., discount rate, cost of harvesting, maxi-
mum shing e¤ort-capacity, division of prots, enforcement costs), a number of
28Hannesson (1995) nds a condition for the countriesdiscount rates that sustains a set of
cooperative equilibria without side payments in a deterministic sequential shery. Hannesson
(1997) discusses the case of a common-pool resource.
29McKelvey (1997) gives two conditions that hold for any cooperative solution: individual
rationality (i.e., cooperative prots for each country are at least as great as those achieved
unilaterally); and collective rationality (i.e., cooperation generates a positive surplus).
30Some of these parameters a¤ect also the timing of signing the agreement. For exam-
ple, Kaitala and Lindroos (2004) examine the conditions under which two parties prefer to
start cooperating immediately, rather than keep negotiating (i.e., postpone cooperation), or
never cooperate. Laukkanen (2005), contrary to Kaitala and Lindroos (2004), concludes that
cooperation is sustained when countries control close to equal shares of the resource.
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environmental factors (e.g., initial stock size, biological growth functions, car-
rying capacity of the ecosystem), and the tastes/preferences of the negotiators
regarding the political feasibility of the proposed cooperative solution.
Joint management with side payments has not received much attention yet
in practice for two reasons: rst, policy makers have traditionally viewed quota
transferring as politically di¢ cult31 -but not impossible- to implement; and sec-
ond, when policy makers are ready to step out of their conventional management
practices and use side payments, they lack, to a large extend, the necessary tools
to calculate compensation levels. My thesis attempts to address the second is-
sue; as for the rst, I believe this is an open question, the answer to which, as the
following examples demonstrate, relies heavily on the culture of the negotiating
parties.
The most celebrated example of side payments in multilateral marine re-
source cooperation is the North Pacic Fur Seal Convention, which was signed
exactly one century ago, in 1911. The North Pacic Fur Seal Convention in-
volved monetary (as well as non-monetary) transfers, and remained into force
until 1984 (by that time, commercial interest for seals had disappeared): the
Canadians and the Japanese decided to stop harvesting, in exchange of receiv-
ing 15% of the USs and Russias annual harvests, or in exchange of getting
$10,000, if the latter two countries decided not to harvest in one year.32
An example in which side payments were justied on the grounds of eco-
nomic e¢ ciency but nally not employed, is the case of the Arcto-Norwegian
cod. Munro (1990) nds that the Norwegians (high-cost shers) would have
been better o¤ by completely renting out their shery to the Russians (low-cost
31Di¢ cult because shers tend to be averse to the idea of foregoing a part of "their" quota.
32The North Pacic Fear Seal Treaty is a wonderful application of Coases Theorem (though
Coase wrote his paper nearly 50 years after this treaty was signed); and a reminder to Econo-
mists that agreements are not just science, but also an art (even if all assumptions of Coases
Theorem were satised, this treaty would not have been signedif it had not been for the ex-
cellent negotiating skills of the US President Taft). Barrett (2005) discusses, in detail, the
history of the agreement, and the reasons for its success.
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harvesters); nevertheless, side payments were considered, at that point, totally
unacceptable.
More recently, however, two Organizations allowed their members to use
monetary transfers. As of 2004, members of the International Commission for
the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas can adjust their national quotas through
international trade (as long as the transaction happens in a transparent man-
ner, and is endorsed by the Organization). Indeed, in 2006 and 2007, the US
transferred 50 metric tones, each time, to Canada. In the case of the Pacic
Salmon, the renewed 2009 treaty contains provisions for side payments (though
the term side payments appears nowhere in the text of the treaty) from the US
to Canada. Munro (2011) notes that the size of these payments may not be ex-
ceptionally large; however, the provisions in the renewed treaty, set a precedent
within the Pacic Salmon cooperative management arrangements.
Overall, I speculate based on discussions with policy makers in the Atlantic
Bluen Tuna shery, that though side payments are not yet widely used, they
could supplement/reform the existing management strategies of Organizations.
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2 Theoretical Framework
The theory is developed in three Sections: Section 2.1 lays out the general
setting for a sequential sh stock with stochastic stock recruitment; Section 2.2
examines the set of possible non-cooperative equilibria; and Section 2.3 explains
the cooperative harvesting pattern with side payments. The analysis in Section
2.3 is developed both in a static and a dynamic setting. Side payments are used
as a means to induce one country to restrict shing activities.
2.1 The Setting: Stochastic Sequential Fishery
Consider the shared sh stock of Figure 1.The stock moves sequentially across
three shing areas: it spawns in a single location in Country As Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ); moves to Country Ps EEZ to feed and mature; and
then to the Adjacent High Sea (AHS) to continue its growth cycle. The matured
population exhibits homing behavior, i.e., returns to A to give birth to a new
spawning class. The new class, along with the old one, repeats a life cycle similar
to the above. Time t is measured in sh generations (therefore, Figure 1 depicts
a single time period). After a couple of iterations, the overall stock consists of
three age groups (larvae, juveniles, and adults).
Fishing takes place in all three areas (As EEZ, Ps EEZ, and AHS). In
each area, recruitment, in period t, is generically denoted by Rt; harvest by
ht; and escapement (or abandonment) by St. Countries A and P are Coastal
States (therefore, have exclusive property rights to harvest the stock in their
territories); in the AHS, the stock is subject to exploitation by any Distant
Water Fishing Nation (DWFN).
At the beginning of period t, and prior any harvesting takes place, both
countries A and P observe the level of returning stock (from the AHS, in period
t  1), and the newly-hatched juveniles in As area.
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Thereafter, Nature makes a choice between two alternatives (States): either
a random event takes place (State (1   )) as A harvests the stock; or no
such event occurs (State ). The random event is associated with stressful
environmental conditions for the resource, resulting in a portion of As stock
dying unexpectedly33 . When State (1   ) occurs, recruitment in A is RA1 ;t;
when State  occurs, recruitment is RA;t. For convenience, in the remaining part
of Section 2, the subscript "" denotes either State of Nature.
When countries observe, at the beginning of period t, the level of returning
stock/newly-hatched juveniles, none of them is able to infer whether the random
event will occur or not. Nevertheless, they share the same beliefs about the
probability of each State realizing: State (1  ) occurs with probability (1  );
State  with probability . The parameter  takes a value between (0; 1)34 .
Country A harvests her recruitment RA;t down to an escapement level S
A
;t =
RA;t   hA;t. As harvest decision hA;t is unobservable to P, and generates to





The amount of stock that remains unharvested by A, migrates wholly to Ps
EEZ. Ps nal recruitment is a function of As escapement, i.e., RP;t  g(SA;t),
with g a deterministic growth function known to both parties. This function
captures the rate at which the stock feeds and matures in Ps area. After the
stock has reached maturity (or a minimum landing size), P extracts an amount
hP;t









the escapement left behind by P.
Ps escapement serves as recruitment to DWFNs, i.e., SP;t  RDWFNs;t . Let
33The justication for the random event a¤ecting only a portion of the stock (not the whole
population), is that the resource consists of di¤erent age classes, some of which (perhaps the
younger ones) are more vulnerable to environmental variability than others (adults).
34The reason why  does not take the values 0 and 1 is that in a Moral Hazard framework,
which will be introduced in Section 2.3, the Principal could use such a piece of information
to exclude specic actions of the Agent. Moreover, the rst order conditions in Sections 2.3.1
and 2.3.2 make sense only when  6= 0; 1.
35The reason why P starts harvesting only after the stock has reached maturity is that
larger classes of sh typically fetch higher market prices per pound than smaller ones.
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 denote the percentage of stock that DWFNs harvest, i.e., hDWFNs;t =  
RDWFNs;t . The parameter  is strictly smaller than 1; this implies that it is not
possible (or protable) for DWFNs to remove the last remaining units of the
resource. Moreover, for simplicity,  is constant over time (though the number
and identities of DWFNs are expected to change). Overall, the analysis treats
DWFNs as a single third party, acting opportunistically and independently of
the two Coastal States36 .
Finally, the escapement SDWFNs;t , left behind by DWFNs, starts its journey
back to Country A. This amount of stock gives rise to the following seasons
recruitment, through function F , i.e., F (SDWFNs;t )  F;t+1 = RA;t+1. This
function is known to both Coastal States and captures two things: the growth
rate of the returning adults while traveling in the AHS; and the newly-hatched
classes in period t + 1. Recruitment in period t + 1 is a random variable in
a similar way as recruitment in period t, i.e., the stock, in the beginning of
period t + 1, is potentially subject to a new random event37 . For simplicity,
random events are independent across time; and Coastal States do not revise
their beliefs ( and (1  )) for the occurrence of the two States.
A new shing cycle begins in period t+1, following a pattern as in period t.
The following Section discusses the set of non-cooperative equilibria that
may emerge between the two Coastal States in this setting; Section 2.3 turns to
the cooperative solution with side payments.
36 I also ignore any short-term (i.e., within the same time period) adjustments in the DWFNs
shing e¤ort. This means that only the most e¢ cient vessels operate in international waters;
it is these vessels that (collectively) deplete the stock by a percentage .
37With a slight abuse of notation, F;t+1 denotes the stock in As area prior the new random
event; while RA;t+1 denotes recruitment after Nature has selected a State in period t+ 1.
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2.2 Non-Cooperative Equilibria and Overexploitation
In a non-cooperative setting, each Coastal State maximizes its own shing prots
without taking into account the e¤ects of her behavior on the other countrys
payo¤ function.
In the setting of Section 2.1, and assuming that the decision variable for
each country is the escapement level, the steady state non-cooperative strate-
gies SA;N:C: and S
P;N:C:
 (for Country A and P, respectively) draw values from
the intervals [SA;o ; S
A;




 ]. Superscripts "o" denote the (monop-
olistic) suboptimal levels; superscripts "" denote the (monopolistic) optimal
levels. The former are calculated by maximizing short-term prots (i.e., these
are the lowest protable abandonment levels at which countries get zero mar-
ginal prots); the latter are found by solving each countrys expected discounted





, for a given/xed strategy of the opponent38 (
denotes the common discount factor, it =
Ri;tZ
Si;t
i(x)dx, x=the in-season stock
level, and i=either country).39
Whether the emerging non-cooperative equilibrium allows for coexistence of
eets, or leads to exclusion of one party from the shery (at least in the long
run40), is an empirical issue. In the context of Section 2.1, it turns out that the
di¤erence in e¢ ciencies of the two harvesting eets, as well as the magnitudes
of the two growth functions (i.e., g and F ), are critical for answering the above
question.
To see this, consider rst the case in which As vessels are more e¢ cient
38The values for the monopolistic optimal escapement levels are estimated under the as-
sumption that there is no assymetric information regarding shing prot functions it, i.e.,
under the assumption that each country knows the opponents harvest cost function (for a
xed market price of the resource).
39McKelvey (1997) and Hannesson (1995) discuss these sets of non-cooperative equilibria,
in a sequentially harvested shery.
40 I.e., after some initial adjustment period in which both countries operate.
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than Ps (i.e., SA;o < S
P;o
 ). Country A excludes P when her strategy S
A;N:C:





. For a slow-growing resource, this
inequality may by satised when A chooses her monopolistic optimal strategy,
i.e., when SA;N:C: = S
A;
 . Nevertheless, for a faster growing resource (i.e., larger
g) As (preferred) strategy SA; may be insu¢ cient to exclude P; A may have
to harvest more aggressively (perhaps, all the way down to her monopolistic
suboptimal level SA;o ) to "kick" the opponent out of the shery. A possibility
also exists that P is never excluded, even if A harvests to the point where she
breaks even.
A similar logic applies to the case in which Ps vessels are more e¢ cient than
As (i.e., SA;o > S
P;o
 ): Ps higher harvesting e¢ ciency does not guarantee As
exclusion. Instead, exclusion is achieved when Ps strategy SP;N:C: satises the
inequality SP;N:C: <
F 1(SA;o )
1  , for any S
P;N:C:
 2 [SP;o ; SP; ]. This inequality
gives the following three comparative static results: assuming F and  xed,
exclusion of A becomes more di¢ cult the smaller Ps comparative advantage
(in harvesting the stock) is; keeping F and the relative harvesting e¢ ciencies
xed, As exclusion becomes more di¢ cult the less aggressive DWFNs are; and
keeping  and relative e¢ ciencies xed, As exclusion is harder the faster the
resource grows in the AHS (i.e., higher F ).
To sum up, the question of exclusion or not (under a non-cooperative setting)
should be answered separately in each shery that resembles that of Section 2.1.
Nevertheless, equilibria that allow for coexistence of eets are expected to be
focal points. There are two reasons why exclusion seems less likely in a sequen-
tial shery: rst, (neighboring) Coastal States tend to employ similar shing
technologies (unless one is a developing country, and the other a developed one);
and second, Coastal States are expected to adopt the objective of not punishing
(i.e., excluding) the other, but of maximizing individual behavior/own prots41 .
41Chunder and Tulkens (1997) argue, for transfrontier environmental problems, in favor of
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2.3 Cooperation with Side Payments
Consider the stochastic sequential shery of Section 2.1, in which Countries
A and P now sign an agreement/contract employing monetary transfers. The
timing of the contract is the following (Figure 2 gives the corresponding ow
diagram). Overall, the purpose of the agreement is to move the two Coastal
States away from the non-cooperative equilibrium, towards a cooperative solu-
tion determined by P (however, mutually preferred).
In the beginning of period t, Country P (he) makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er
to Country A (she). When P makes his o¤er, he is uncertain which State of
Nature will occur. P o¤ers monetary compensation wt to A, with a view to
inducing her to restrict her shing activities. If A accepts the o¤er, P receives
a higher level of recruitment RP:;t; and therefore, harvests in excess of his non-
cooperative level.
After A considers Ps compensation wt and her level of recruitment RA;t
(in either state of nature), she extracts an amount hA;t(R
A
;t; t). The variable
t denotes As regulatory e¤ort to control her shers, such that her overall
harvest level is less than the non-cooperative one (the variable t does not
refer to the Agents shing e¤ort). As regulatory e¤ort t, harvesting behavior
hA;t(R
A
;t; t), and the realized State of Nature, remain all unobservable to P
throughout the shing season t.
As regulatory e¤ort t is a discrete variable, i.e., 0 = t1 < t2 < ::: <
ti < ::: < tn = t, and comes with an implementation cost. For simplicity,













, with u denoting utility
the individual maximization behavior, rather than the vidictive behavior assumption.
Laukkanen (2003) adopts (in her shery analysis), contrary to Chunder and Tulkens (1997),
the vindictive behavior assumption (according to which both countries play at their break-
even prot levels). Nevertheless, her emerging non-cooperative equilibrium is one in which
countries coexist.
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from shing prots At , and monetary compensation wt; and c(t) disutility
from implementing the regulatory e¤ort t.




;t)) depends positively on
As level of regulatory e¤ort t42 . Moreover, Ps recruitment is a commonly
observable variable (RP;t  g(S
A
;t)); therefore, it is used as the basis for provid-












At the end of shing season t, both Coastal States announce their harvest
levels hA;t and h
P
;t to each other
43 . The contract is then executed: compensa-
tion wt is provided as a function of the commonly observable outcome (RP;tor
RP1 ;t).
The above agreement describes a Moral Hazard problem (with a discrete
e¤ort variable t, and two possible outcomes RP;t , R
P
1 ;t for each level of
e¤ort): the Agents action (i.e., Country As regulatory e¤ort t) is not directly
observable by the Principal (Country P); the two parties have a conict of
interests (i.e., As regulatory e¤ort a¤ects her payo¤s negatively44 , but benets
P); compensation wt is based on a commonly observable variable (i.e., RP;t);
and the observable variable is a noisy signal of As action (i.e., RP;t aggregates
As regulatory e¤ort and the realization of either State of Nature). This Moral
Hazard setting follows the traditional formulation for hidden action problems45 .
42The higher As regulatory e¤ort t is, the higher is her escapement SA;t, and thus Ps
recruitment RP;t. For this reason, R
P
;t is written, in Figure 2, with a subscript t, i.e., as
RP;t .
43 In reality, countries participating in international sheries organizations are required to
provide harvest reports within every shing season (i.e., in-season reports). Nevertheless,
these reports tend to be signicanlty revised at the end of every (shing) year; therefore,
countries are unable to infer, from the interim reports, how aggresively their "opponents"
behave. Only when the stock has completed a full cycle, and only when each country has
harvested the resource (for that specic season), do contracting parties learn about each
others (past) harvest levels. For this reason, it makes sense to assume, in the analysis, that
As harvesting behavior hA;t(R
A
;t; t) and regulatory e¤ort t are both unobservable throught
the shing season t.
44 It a¤ects her negatively not only through the disutility c(t), but also by lowering her
shing prots At .
45"Traditional" in the sense that the States of Nature are unobservable to both parties,
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Section 2.3.1 solves for the conditions characterizing the optimal second best
contract in a static framework; while Section 2.3.2 extends the analysis to a
dynamic setting. The latter is more realistic, since the resource is a renewable
one and the parties are expected to interact repeatedly over time.
Before proceeding formally with any of the analytical models (either static,
or dynamic), a comment is necessary to explain why the analysis assigns the
role of the Principal to Country P (and the role of the Agent to Country A).
Consider momentarily the alternate scenario in which Country A (now the Prin-
cipal) o¤ers compensation to Country P (now the Agent) in order to harvest
less aggressively: compensation would be a function of the Principals output
(in this case, SA;t), which would also be observable by the other party (since
RP;t = g(S
A
;t)). Nevertheless, applying the above Moral Hazard analysis to this
alternate scenario is no longer realistic; it is di¢ cult to imagine now the Agent
(Country P) taking a hidden action for a specic shing season (e.g., for sea-
son t). The Agent (Country P) could keep her action hidden, only if she were
not announcing her harvest level at the end of the shing season t. Having,
in the alternate scenario, one of the two parties announcing its harvest level
at the end of season t, while the other keeping it undisclosed, contradicts the
current practice. In summary, the alternate scenario treats the two parties in
a very asymmetric fashion; it makes more sense to have a model in which both
countries announce catches at the end of the same shing season46 .
and the output (RP;t ) is observable; contrary to the less standard approach of Chambers
and Quiggin, in which the States of Nature, not the output, are observable (see, for instance,
Chambers (2002)).
46The (also symmetric) case in which neither country announces catches at all, would take
the analysis to a double moral hazard setting, which is beyond the purpose of my thesis.
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2.3.1 Static Model
This Section gives the set of rst order conditions to the optimal static (spot)
contract in period t. These conditions characterize the optimal second best regu-



















When As regulatory e¤ort t is a discrete variable 0 = t1 < t2 < ::: <
ti < ::: < tn = t, the output RP;t also takes values in a discrete set. Each
level of e¤ort t maps into two outputs, one for each state, and with strictly
positive probabilities ( and (1   ))47 . To continue with the solution of the
moral hazard problem, it is necessary to impose more structure on the set of
output values, such that P is not certain (by simply observing an output) about
the exerted level of e¤ort t.
The simplest possible structure for a moral hazard problem is that in which
every level of observed output RP;t (except in two cases) is derived by two adja-
cent levels of regulatory e¤ort: say, by e¤ort i under State , or by e¤ort i+1
under State (1   ). The two exceptions, in which the unobservability of As
e¤ort is no longer an issue for P, are the lowest and highest possible values of
RP;t.
48
Assuming ti is the optimal level of regulatory e¤ort, P solves the following
47 In the typical textbook moral hazard model, every level of As action maps into the
same set of more than two outputs, with varying (for each level of e¤ort) strictly positive
probabilities. Here, however, each level of e¤ort maps into two outputs only. This is the
equivalent of a textbook model, in which every level of e¤ort maps into the same set of more
than two outputs, but with weakly positive probabilities.
48To see this, consider rst A taking the lowest possible e¤ort level t1 = 0, while State
(1 ) occurs. Then, P can infer As e¤ort level (being zero), by simply observing the outcome
RP;t  R
P





, he knows that A has
exerted the highest possible level of e¤ort tn = t, and State  has occurred.
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program49 , at the beginning of period t (i.e., after observing the level of return-
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Note that this problem involves (n  1) incentive compatibility constraints;
and that the right hand side of the IRt captures As utility from her non-
cooperative shing prots. The latter are:
49The rst order conditions are taken with respect to the two compensation levels, w(RP;ti )
and w(RP1 ;ti ), for a given optimal e¤ort ti.
50The solution of the optimal contract is calculated for a specic level of (t   1) returning
stock/newly hatched juveniles, in As area. In the notation of Section 2.1, the level of stock
in As area before Nature selects a State was Ft.
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P solves the above program for every level of regulatory e¤ort ti, i.e., nds
the corresponding (to each e¤ort) optimal compensation levels, w(RP;ti) and




The First Order conditions derived from all programs are the following.
 For the lowest possible output (realized under State (1   )), i.e., for
RP;ti  R
P
1 ;0, P solves the above program with optimal level of regula-











with  and 1; denoting, respectively, the Lagrange multipliers of the par-
ticipation and the (n  1) incentive compatibility constraints52 ;
 For the highest possible output (realized under State ), i.e., for RP;ti 
RP;t , P solves the above program with optimal level of regulatory ef-











51The maximum value function Vt is written for a given level of As non-cooperative shing
prots A;N:Ct (Ft).
52For instance, 1;2 denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the incentive compatibility constraint
written for the optimal e¤ort t1 and the (suboptimal) e¤ort t2; 1;3 the Lagrange multiplier
of the incentive compatibility constraint written for the optimal e¤ort t1 and the (suboptimal)
e¤ort t3, etc.
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with  and n; denoting again the Lagrange multipliers
53 ;







, which are realized under State , P solves the
above program with optimal level of regulatory e¤ort any ti except tn =

















with  and i;i+1, i; denoting the Lagrange multipliers;







, which are realized under State (1 ), P solves
the above program with optimal level of regulatory e¤ort any ti except
t1 = 0. The First Order condition for the compensation corresponding
















with  and i;i 1, i; denoting the Lagrange multipliers.
Note that the last two rst order conditions give di¤erent compensation
values, though they refer to the same output. For instance, when P observes
the output RP;t2  R
P
1 ;t3 , he estimates one compensation value according
to the third condition, i.e., from the problem with optimal e¤ort ti = t2; and
another, according to the fourth condition, i.e., from the problem with optimal
53For instance, n;2 denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the incentive compatibility constraint
written for the optimal e¤ort tn = t and the (suboptimal) e¤ort t2.
27
e¤ort ti = t3. The reason why P estimates two compensation values is that
each level of output (except the two extremes54) is the result of either e¤ort i
under State , or e¤ort i+1 under State (1  ).
P solves a system of the above First Order conditions depending on the
level of regulatory e¤ort 0 = t1 < t2 < ::: < ti < ::: < tn = t each
time considered. Each system gives solutions for the compensation provided to
A. In the end, he compares his maximum value function Vt(
A;N:C
t (Ft)) from
each program, and o¤ers only the specic solution that gives him the highest
expected payo¤s. This solution corresponds to the optimal level of regulatory

















54For each of the extremes, i.e., for the lowest and highest possible outputs, P solves only
one condition (the rst and the second, respectivelly).
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2.3.2 Dynamic Model
Methodologically, the literature on dynamic Moral Hazard models with inde-
pendent shocks across time (see, for instance, Bolton and Dewatripont (2005),
or La¤ont and Martimort (2002)), distinguishes between two cases: a compre-
hensive long-term contract without renegotiation; and a long-term contract with
renegotiation.
The dynamic analysis here focuses on the former, i.e., the case of full com-
mitment. Both parties agree on a single contract at the initial negotiation stage,
and neither Country A nor P can renege. Implicit in the dynamic (as well as
in the static) analysis is the assumption that the contract is court-enforceable.
In other words, RP;t is not only observable but also veriable by an outside
arbiter. The role of this external third party is to impose severe penalties to
any country that makes a di¤erent representation for RP;t than its true realized
value.
In reality, nevertheless, Coastal States are sovereign shing nations. There-
fore, no supra-national organization could impose severe penalties to them for
having breached an agreement. For this reason, Appendices A and B provide
an extension to the dynamic model by relaxing the assumption of court enforce-
ability. Cooperation, in Appendix A, extends only to two time periods, but
Country A is now allowed to renege; while Appendix B examines the innite
contracting case (i.e., the most realistic of all settings).
The full commitment long-term contract without renegotiation has P mak-
ing a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er at the beginning of period t = 1. For simplicity,
repetition extends only to one period, i.e., t = 1; 2. Ps o¤er, in the beginning of
period t = 1, species three sets of compensation levels: the rst one, w1(R
P
;1 ),











), to compensation o¤ered in
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;1 ) is a function of the (commonly) observable output R
P
;1
in period t = 1; instead, the second period compensation levels are functions
of the current (i.e., RP;2 ), and the past (i.e., R
P
1 ;1
, or RP;1 ) recruitment
levels. The optimal contract induces A to take regulatory e¤ort 1 in period
t = 1, and 2 in period t = 2
55 . The timing of the contract is the following.
At the beginning of period t = 1, P observes the level of stock F1 in As
area56 , and makes an o¤er for all-periods compensation levels. If A rejects this
o¤er, the game ends (since this is a contract without renegotiation). If she
accepts, A picks her action 1i in the rst period; both parties observe the real-
ization of Ps recruitment RP;1i in period t = 1; and P provides compensation
according to the terms of the contract. In the second time period, A picks her
action 2i (based on the rst periods output realization RP;1i , and the second
period compensation levels); both parties observe Ps recruitment level RP;2i in
period t = 2; and compensation is o¤ered according to the contract. The game
then ends.
P solves for the optimal long term contract through backwards induction:
he rst considers the static problems in the beginning of period t = 2, following
55The second period optimal e¤ort 2 is a function of the rst periods output realization;











keep the notation simple, I drop RP;1
.
56Recall, from Section 2.1, that Ft denotes the level of stock in the beginning of period t,
i.e., prior Nature selects a State.
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some rst period output RP;1i , and then moves backwards to the rst period
problem (taking into account the continuation payo¤s for the second period).
The recursive procedure used to solve the long-term contract implies that
the long-term contract is sequentially optimal. Since P starts solving the op-
timal long-term contract for a given promise (in the second period), there is
no point him o¤ering another continuation contract (other than the one he has
calculated from the solution of the optimal long-term contract); so by denition,
the optimal long term contract is sequentially optimal and renegotiation-proof
(La¤ont and Martimort (2002), p.326).
In the beginning of period t = 2, P realizes there are two spot contracts
he could o¤er (given the two possible States of Nature, and the corresponding
outputs from period t = 1): for some xed level of regulatory e¤ort 1i in the
rst period, either output RP;1i , or output R
P
1 ;1irealizes.
The second period spot contract following a rst period output RP;1i is
identical to the Static model of Section 2.3.1, with t = 2 and:
Ft = F;1i;2 = F (S
DWFNs








































Similarly, the second period spot contract following a rst period output
RP1 ;1i is identical to the Static model, with t = 2 and:
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Ft = F1 ;1i;2 = F (S
DWFNs








































In the end of the second period, Ps expected payo¤s are either V2(
A;N:C
2 (F;1i;2))
(following output RP;1i), or V2(
A;N:C
2 (F1 ;1i;2)) (following output R
P
1 ;1i).
Once P calculates the optimal continuations of the contract in the second
period, he move backwards to the rst: the optimal long-term contract without
renegotiation solves the following program ( is the common discount factor; P

























































































































































for all 1i0 6= 1i;























































The non-cooperative shing prots, in the right hand side of the (IR), are:











Note that Ps above objective function consists of his rst period payo¤s,
and his expected continuation payo¤s V2. Similarly, the constraints (IC) and
(IR) take into account As continuation payo¤s. Maximization is with respect









, and the two
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The solution of the above program with respect to the rst period optimal
compensation levels w1(RP;1i) and w1(R
P
1 ;1i) (for some optimal level of reg-
ulatory e¤ort 1i in period t = 1), resembles the solution of the Static problem
(simply replace, in the First Order conditions of Section 2.3.1, where t = 1; the
Static conditions are not rewritten here).
Maximization with respect to the "promises", A;N:C2 (F;1i;2) and 
A;N:C
2 (F1 ;1i;2),
yields a second set of First Order conditions. This second set of First Order
conditions derived from all programs (i.e., for every level of optimal e¤ort 1i)
are the following.
 For the lowest possible output in period t = 1 (realized under State (1 )),
i.e., for RP;1i  R
P
1 ;0, P solves the above dynamic program with optimal





+  =  V 02(
A;N:C
2 (F1 ;0;2))
with  and 1; denoting, respectively, the Lagrange multipliers of the in-
tertemporal participation and the (n  1) incentive compatibility constraints;
 For the highest possible output in period t = 1 (realized under State ),
i.e., for RP;1i  R
P
;1
, P solves the above dynamic program with optimal
level of regulatory e¤ort 1i = 1n = 1. The First Order condition for
the corresponding "promise" is:
57A expects to get payo¤s, in the end of period t = 2, at least as much as her non-
cooperative shing prots; i.e., the contract "promises" A to reach at least this level of prots





+  =  V 02(
A;N:C
2 (F;1;2))
with  and n; denoting again the Lagrange multipliers
58 ;







, which are realized (in t = 1) under State , P
solves the above dynamic program with optimal level of regulatory e¤ort











+  =  V 02(
A;N:C
2 (F;1i;2))
with  and i;i+1, i; denoting the Lagrange multipliers of the dynamic
problem;







, which are realized (in t = 1) under State (1 
), P solves the above dynamic program with optimal level of regulatory











+  =  V 02(
A;N:C
2 (F1 ;1i;2))
with  and i;i 1, i; denoting the Lagrange multipliers of the dynamic
problem.
58These Lagrange multipliers are di¤erent from those referring to the dynamic problem with
t1 = 0 the optimal level of e¤ort.
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Note that the left hand side of the last four conditions are similar to the
left hand side of the four conditions of the Static problem (written for t = 1).




















 =  V 02(A;N:C2 (F1 ;1i;2))
The above four equations provide the main theoretical result of the thesis: a
relationship between the optimal compensation w1 in the rst time period, and
the optimal compensation in the second period (through the continuation pay-
o¤s V2). This relationship is the equivalent of the intertemporal consumption
smoothing" (or "Martingale property) of the repeated Moral Hazard problem
between an employer and an employee (Rogerson (1985)). The Martingale prop-
erty is written here in the context of sheries, for a given rst-period output
realization (RP1 ;0, or R
P
;1
, or RP;1i , or R
P
1 ;1i).
The typical interpretation of the Martingale property, in a twice repeated
Moral Hazard problem, is that the rst period payments and their expected
continuations are linked ("the optimal long-term contract with full commitment
exhibits memory"); specically, payments covary positively (i.e., a high output
in the rst period is rewarded not only in that period, but also in t = 2).
Intuitively, P spreads the rewards intertemporally; he does not want to give
36
all rewards (necessary to induce e¤ort) in period t = 1, but prefers to smooth
the burden of the incentive compatibility constraint (to induce e¤ort) between
today and tomorrow.
In the shery problem, further identication of the exact link between rst
and second period payments requires the calculation of the derivative V 02 . This
derivative, under the structure imposed on this problem59 , is the di¤erence be-
tween the second period maximum value functions V2 referring to two "adjacent"
levels of stock (for F;1i+1;2  F1 ;1i;2):
V 02(
A;N:C












for any 1i (including 0).
Further simplication of this di¤erence (and thus, further insights on the
structure between rst and second period payments) is possible only after con-
sidering specic functional relationships for the shing prot functions.
The Principal, based on the two sets of First Order conditions in the dy-
namic problem, estimates, for every possible level of regulatory e¤ort 1i, his
(intertemporal) maximum value function. Finally, he compares all his expected
payo¤s, and o¤ers the contract that gives him the highest value. This is the













A;N:C2 (F;1 ;2) and 
A;N:C
2 (F1 ;1 ;2).
59 I.e., when As e¤ort is a discrete variable 0 = t1 < t2 < ::: < ti < ::: < tn = t,
and when every level of observed output RP;t (except in two cases) is derived by two adjacent
levels of e¤ort, say 1i and 1i+1.
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3 Calibration to the Western Atlantic Bluen
Tuna (WABFT)
Section 3.1 briey describes the status of the Western Atlantic Bluen Tuna
(WABFT) shery and the current management measures. Section 3.2 discusses
the quota transfer policy alternative in this shery; Section 3.3 presents the
sources of data for deriving empirical values for the components of the theory
in the case of WABFT; and Section 3.4 gives the results of the calibration.
3.1 The WABFT Fishery
The Atlantic Bluen Tuna (Thunnus thynnus) is a highly migratory stock found
in the Western Atlantic, Eastern Atlantic, and the Mediterranean Sea. The In-
ternational Commission for the Conservation of the Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)
has been managing bluen tuna in two groups, since 198260 : the Eastern At-
lantic/Mediterranean stock, and the Western Atlantic stock. These groups are
separated by the 45 degrees West Meridian (Figure 3); and the Western Atlantic
population is considerably smaller than the Eastern Atlantic/Mediterranean
one61 . My thesis focuses on the Western Atlantic, because this management
unit ts into the sequential shery setting of Section 2.1.
The Western Atlantic group spans from Labrador and Newfoundland south
into the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea and the coasts o¤Venezuela/Brazil.
Spawning of this stock is believed to occur from mid April to mid June, in
the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida62 . During the summer months,
60The Convention for the conservation of Atlantic Tunas was signed in 1969. Currently,
ICCAT consists of 48 contracting parties.
61For instance, ICCATs annual Total Allowable Catch, for 2011 and 2012, is set at
1750 metric tons in the Western Atlantic; versus 12900 metric tons in the Eastern At-
lantic/Mediterranean.
62Other spawning areas have been hypothesized, e.g., in the mid Atlantic (Lutcavage et
al. (1999)). Nevertheless, identifying clearly spawning areas is a di¢ cult task, because tunas
spawn fractionally, i.e., release eggs over several days.
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the stock moves northern, along the American continental shelf, with higher
densities found in the Gulf of Maine, and o¤ Nova Scotia.
Overall, the population structure of the stock remains poorly understood.
Bluen tunas exhibit homing behavior, i.e., return to their spawning grounds,
typically every year63 . The exact routes of this return are not completely known:
movements vary across class sizes and environmental conditions. Older evidence
(Mather et al. (1995)) had suggested that the stock, particularly the juveniles,
when traveling back to the Gulf of Mexico, remain mainly in coastal waters
(along the US/Canadian continental shelf). More recent research (Lutcavage et
al. (1999), Block et al. (2005), Wilson et al. (2005)) points out that the adults
(i.e., the part of the stock that is older than 10 years) rst move o¤shore, to
international waters in the North-central Atlantic (and specically, east of the
Flemish Cap64), and then return to the Gulf of Mexico.
The WABFT shery has three main players65 , all members of ICCAT: US,
Canada, and Japan (the rst two are Coastal States; the latter is a Distant Wa-
ter Fishing Nation). Historically, intense shing by these countries has reduced
the abundance of the stock; as a result, the U.S., Canadian, and Japanese sh-
eries have been subject to strict quotas. Quotas are set by ICCAT, every 2 years,
after a considerable amount of debate. ICCATs decisions become e¤ective 6
months after formal submission to all contracting parties.
In 1998, due to the overshed status of the stock, ICCAT initiated a 20-
year Western Atlantic Rebuilding Plan. The annual Total Allowable Catch was
initially set at 2500 metric tons; this number has been adjusted periodically,
and dropped to 1750 metric tons for 2011 and 2012. Figure 4 shows how total
63Nevertheless, bluen tunas are not obligate annual spawners; they may exhibit the "de-
layed maturation" type of skipping spawning (Secor (2007)).
64The Flemish Cap lies outside Canadas Exclusive Economic Zone. The stock, there, is
vulnerable to vessels from Distant Water Fishing Nations.
65There are three other smaller players: UK (in respect of Bermuda), France (in respect of
St. Pierre et Miquelon), and Mexico.
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quotas and catches have varied in the Western Atlantic from 1982 to 200. Total
catches reduced signicantly during 2003-2008, due to the inability of the US
to fully land her quota those years.
In the US, catches reached their highest level (since 1979) in 2002. Shortly
after, the US started experiencing a reduction in catches. The annual declines
in catches, during the period 2004-200866 , account for up to a 65% shortfall
compared to the annual quotas set by ICCAT. In 2009, the US was able to fully
utilize its quota; in 2010, however, this was not possible.
Recreational and commercial bluen tuna sheries in the U.S. are managed
on a calendar year, and are subject to federal jurisdiction from the shoreline
(i.e., State waters are also included67). A variety of gears is used to catch
bluen tuna68 ; however, about 70% of the total weight of catches comes from
the Rod and Reel shery69 .
In Canada, catches have been relatively stable, around 400-600 metric tons,
during the period 2002-200970 . The main gear used in Canada is Rod and Reel,
and shers operate in several geographic areas o¤ the Atlantic coast from July
66US catches in period 2004-2008 were 1066, 848, 615, 858, and 922 metric tons respectively
(NOAA (2011b)).
67There are three exceptions (Maine, Connecticut, Mississippi) in which State regulations
apply in State waters.
68Any vessel harvesting bluen tuna in the US must obtain either an Atlantic Tuna Permit,
or an Atlantic HMS Tuna Permit. There are 5 types of Atlantic Tuna Permits (all belong
to the commercial sector): General (i.e., all hand gears: Rod and Reel, Harpoon, Handline,
Bandit Gear); Harpoon; Trap; Longline; and Purse Seine. The Atlantic HMS Tuna Permits
are issued in 2 categories: HMS Angling, and HMS Charter/Headboat (both categories use
similar gears: Rod and Reel, Handlines, and Speargun (the latter for tunas other than BFT).
The di¤erence between the Anlging and the Charter/Headboat category is that the Char-
ter/Headboat carries passengers for hire (i.e., passengers pay a fee); the Angling category is
for private shing). Moreover, the HMS Angling category belongs only to the recreational
sector; the HMS Charter/Headboat belongs to both recreational and commercial sectors.
69The Rod and Reel shery is by far the largest and most popular in terms of number of
participants and volume of catches. It occurs mainly o¤ the New England area, and the coasts
of Virginia, North and South Carolina.
Catches from purse seiners, on the other hand, have been declining. For instance, in 2008,
purse seinerslandings were 0; and in 2009, their landings accounted only for 1% of the total
US bluen tuna catches (while their initial allocation of the US quota was 18.8%). The lack of
availability of stock in the US, and the high operating costs in 2009 were the reasons behind
the purse seinerslow catches (NOAA (2010)).
70Canadian catches peaked at 733 metric tons, in 2006; and dropped to 530 metric tons, in
2009.
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to November (when tunas have migrated into Canadian waters). The spatial
distribution of the Canadian sheries has not changed signicantly during the
last decade; however, there are anecdotal reports of bluen tunas occurring in
areas where they had not been observed for many years (for example, in the
Baie des Chaleurs, and the western Gulf of St. Lawrence). Catch rates in the
Gulf of Saint Lawrence have increased rapidly since 2004 (ICCAT (2010)).
Japanese catches have uctuated between 300-500 metric tons; nevertheless,
in 2009, they dropped to 162 metric tons. Overall, the number of Japanese
longline vessels declined to about 50 in 2007, of which about 20 operated in the
Western Atlantic. In 2009, there were less than 10 longline vessels targeting
bluen tuna.
The US, due to the continuing overshing status of the stock and the shortfall
in her catches, requested, in 2007, a multiyear moratorium in both sides of the
Atlantic. Canada, on the other hand, suggested a moratorium only in the
Eastern Atlantic. Though both proposals were backed up by scientic evidence,
ICCAT largely ignored these recommendations during its 2008 meeting. This
outcome was perceived with great disappointment, particularly by the US.
In 2010, ICCAT also rejected a proposal (put forward by the Principality of
Monaco71) to list the Atlantic Bluen tuna under Appendix I of the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. This
proposal would have banned international trade of bluen tuna, and helped the
stock recover. Instead, ICCAT simply expressed its commitment to suspend
in the future the Western Atlantic Bluen Tuna sheries, if a serious threat of
stock collapse becomes obvious (ICCAT (2010b))72 .
71Delegates from the US, Canada and the EU had also supported this proposal; the Japanese
lobbied successfully against it.
72A similar recommendation to suspend bluen tuna shing in the Eastern At-
lantic/Meditteranean was issued in 2009.
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3.2 The Quota Transfer Policy Alternative
Since the US started experiencing signicant reductions in her catches, US sh-
ers were concerned that ICCAT, in one of its future meetings, may decide to
transfer any unlled US quota portion to another country (Canada, Japan, or
one of the smaller players). Indeed, in 2010, ICCATs allocation scheme for
national quotas was slightly revised (ICCAT (2010b)).
Up to 2010, the US was allocated 57.48% of the total Western Atlantic
quota; for 2011 and 2012 however, the US gets a smaller percentage, 54.02%.
The main di¤erence between the two plans is that the new scheme no longer
assigns a xed tonnage to the small players (Mexico, UK, France); instead,
it gives them percentages of the total quota (5.56% to Mexico; 0.23% to the
UK; and 0.23% to France). Canada and Japan retain their historic allocations
(22.32% and 17.64%, respectively). The changes in the revised plan do not
translate yet to signicant losses for the US shers (for instance, in 2010, the
US baseline quota was 977 metric tons; for 2011 and 2012, it is 948 metric
tons73); nevertheless, they send a signal to the US regarding other countries
demands to further reduce the USs share in the future (if her shortfalls are
persistent).
One of the two hypothesis the scientic community has put forward in order
to explain the USs shortfalls, argues that a portion of the US stock may have
shifted to northern locations (McAllister et al. (2008)74)75 .
73The baseline quota is further adjusted for any dead discards and underharvests; the nal
US quota for 2011 is 858mt (not 948mt).
74McAllister et al. (2008) compare the geolocations of satellite-tagged Bluen tunas from
1996-2005, and conclude that a large concentration from the Carolinas has moved into the
Gulf of St. Lawrence. Moreover, in 2008, large Bluen tunas were absent in US waters. In the
Gulf of St. Lawrence, the decrease in the median Bluen tuna (from 400kg to 300kg) reects
the higher abundance of youger sh.
In general, bluen tunas are found in a wide range of ecosystems, where temperature varies
between 2 and 29C. This major variability in locations could be the result of shing pressure
and environmental parameters (for instance, local availability of adequate preys, or availability
of suitable spawning conditions) uctuating from year to year (NOAA (2010)).
75The second hypothesis is that the overall size of the population in the Western Atlantic
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As a response to the problem of reduced catches, shers in the US request
more lenient regulations; their landings could be maximized by relaxing domes-
tic regulations. Though the US administration was initially reluctant to adopt
such a proposal (as a long-term sustainable solution), it nally tripled (from 1 to
3), in 2010, the daily retention limit for large medium and giant bluen tunas.
Despite this elevated limit, the US landings were low by the end of summer
2010; therefore, in 2011, the US National Marine Fisheries Service decided to
revert to the default daily limit.
I argue that a policy alternative the US may want to consider, such that
she does not permanently lose (in one of ICCATs future meetings) the unlled
portion of her quota, is a transfer to Canada. A conditional quota transfer
from the US to Canada would allow the latter to exploit any extra stock he
may receive from the US, i.e., any stock beyond his ICCAT share; in the same
time, the US would be compensated (from Canada) for giving up some of her
right to harvest the stock, in the event that she was not able to fully utilize her
quota. Without such a contractual agreement, Canada, who typically abides by
ICCATs rules, would have to leave the extra stock unharvested; the stock would
end up in international waters. To sum up, it is in the interest of both Coastal
States (US and Canada) to jointly exploit this stock, before Japan extracts it
in international waters (or before ICCAT assigns an even higher quota share to
one of the smaller players in the shery). The US shers have also expressed
their objections to the prospect of having Japan harvesting this stock: "it would
be better for the stock if the quota was caught by us, than by vessels from less
restrictive parties" (US Federal Register (2009), p. 26112).
The use of a quota transfer, as a policy alternative to supplement existing
regulations, is already permitted by ICCAT. As of 2004, country members are
allowed to transfer up to 15% of their national quotas (ICCAT (2004)) (higher
has declined substantially during the last years.
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percentages are allowed for smaller players76). Transfers are time transactions
within a given shing year; countries cannot retransfer quotas they receive; and
transfers cannot be used to cover overharvests77 .
Indeed, in 2006 and 2007, the US transferred 50 metric tones, each time,
to Canada. Despite the fact that US regulations (US Federal Register (2009),
p. 26112) require that the potential benets of a quota transfer should be
evaluated (among other things78) before the transfer takes place, the amount of
compensation the US shers received, in the above two instances, was zero.
Therefore, performing a calibration exercise of the theoretical framework for
side payments in the case of Western Atlantic Bluen Tuna shery, may provide
policy makers with a rough estimate for the amount of compensation Canada
should provide to the US.
76UK and France can transfer up to 100% (4 metric tons) of their allocations; Mexico is
allowed, for 2011 and 2012, to transfer up to 91% (86.5 metric tons) of its quota (ICCAT
(2010b)).
77Overharvests in a given year are subtracted from that partys quota for the next year. If
overharvests occur for any two consecutive management periods, then ICCAT recommends
further reductions of that partys quota and, if necessary, trade restrictive measures.
Underharvests in a given year may be carried forward to the next year. Nevertheless, an
underharvest cannot exceed 10% of the partys initial quota allocation (some exceptions apply
for the small players). The US shers have requested that the US delegation renegotiates with
ICCAT this percentage (from 10% to at least 25%).
78Such as the amount of quota proposed to be transferred, the projected ability of the US
vessels to harvest the total US bluen tuna quota before the end of the shing season, and
the contracting partys ICCAT compliance status.
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3.3 Sources of Data for Calibration
This section describes the sources of data used to derive empirically the parame-
ters for the functional relationships of Section 2 in the case of WABFT shery.
For mathematical convenience, the calibration turns to the simplest possible
case of the theoretical model: the Agent chooses between two possible levels of
regulatory e¤ort, i.e., i = 1; 2 (instead of i = 1:::n, in Section 2); and the Prin-
cipal observes one out of three possible levels of output, i.e., recruitment RP;ti
takes either a low, medium, or high value (instead of (n+ 1) possible values, in
Section 2).
In summary, the components of the theoretical model for calibration are:
 the initial stock biomass Ft in the US before the realization of either State
of Nature;
 the level of recruitment RA;t in the US Exclusive Economic Zone when no
random event occurs;
 the level of recruitment RA1 ;t in the US when the random event occurs;
 the USs harvest function hA;t(RA;t; ti) for di¤erent levels of biomass and
regulatory e¤ort ti;
 the USs harvest prot function At (SA;t; RA;t) for di¤erent levels of escape-
ment and biomass;
 the USs utility u, derived by her shing prots and by receiving monetary
compensation from Canada;
 the USs disutility c(ti) by implementing regulatory e¤ort ti;
 the USs non-cooperative shing prots A;N:C:(Ft);
 the stock growth function g in Canadas Exclusive Economic Zone;
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 Canadas harvest function hP (RP;ti) for di¤erent levels of biomass;
 Canadas harvest prot function Pt (SP;t; RP;t) for di¤erent levels of escape-
ment and biomass;
 the probability (1  ) that environmental variability occurs;
 the stocks exploitation rate  by the Distant Water Fishing Nations
(Japan);
 and the stocks growth function F in the Adjacent High Sea.
The following paragraphs discuss these components in detail; while Table 2
provides a summary of the parameters and functional relationships used for the
baseline calibrations.
Over the recent years, spawning biomass has uctuated between 18-27% of
1975s level (ICCAT (2008)): for instance, in 2007, it was approximately 25% of
33000 tons (1975s level); in 2006, about 18% of this amount. For the purposes
of the calibration, the smaller percentage 18% is used. Therefore, biomass Ft
in the US before the realization of either State of Nature is approximately 5940
metric tons.
The level of recruitment RA;t in the US Exclusive Economic Zone when no
random event occurs takes, for simplicity, the same value as Ft, i.e. RA;t = 5940
metric tons.
In order to estimate the USs level of biomass RA1 ;t when the random event
occurs, I employ the following approach: rst, I calculate the yearly percentage
change in the total Western Atlantic bluen tuna landings during the period
2004-2009 (during this period, the US was not able to land fully her assigned
quotas); then I take the average of the percentage reductions; and nally I
assume that the same percentage reduction applies to the abundance of the
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stock. For the purposes of the calibration, RA1 ;t is approximately 90% of Ft,
i.e. RA1 ;t = 5346 metric tons.
79
An econometric estimation of the production (harvest) function of either
country is not possible80 . The amount the US harvests hA;t(R
A
;t; ti) is a function
of her biomass RA;t and e¤ort ti (to control her shers). Finding exactly how
regulatory e¤ort ti a¤ects harvests is not possible; therefore, I assign values to
the USs harvests (for di¤erent combinations of regulatory e¤ort and biomass),
taking into account the following: the amount the US extracts when she takes
a low level of regulatory e¤ort t1 and no random event occurs corresponds
approximately to her quota-not landings- during the recent years; the amount
the US extracts when she takes a low level of regulatory e¤ort t1 and the
random event occurs corresponds approximately to her lowest realized landings-
not quotas-during the recent years; and the amount the US harvests when she
takes a high level of regulatory e¤ort t2 (and either State of Nature realizes) is
lower than the amount under a low level of regulatory e¤ort. For the purposes of
the calibration, the following values are assigned: hA;t(R
A
;t; t1) = 1200 metric
tons; hA1 ;t(R
A




;t; t2) = 960 metric tons;
and hA1 ;t(R
A
1 ;t; t2) = 606 metric tons. These harvest levels create a Moral
Hazard problem for Canada (the USs escapement when the low regulatory e¤ort
t1 is exerted and no random event occurs is the same as her escapement when
the high level of regulatory e¤ort t2 is exerted and the random event occurs).
Similarly, for Canada, I assign values to his harvests hP;t(R
P
;ti), taking into
79The total bluen tuna landings in the Western Atlantic for the years 2004-2009 were
2306, 2125, 1756, 1811, 1638, 2000, and 1935 metric tons respectively (ICCAT (2010), Table
1). Averaging across the yearly percentage reductions (a reduction of 7% for the 2003-2004
period, 17% for the 2004-2005 period, 9.5% for the period 2006-2007, and 3.25% for the period
2008-2009) I get a value of 9.2%, or approximately 10%.
80For an econometric estimation of a production function, data on biomass, e¤ort and
catches are required. ICCATs website does not provide biomass data to proceed in this
fashion. Moreover, regarding e¤ort, ICCAT data refer to the number of shing hrs of vessels
targeting all types of tunas, not just bluen. Therefore, extrapolating the level of e¤ort
directed to bluen specically, would require some assumptions on the allocation of shing
time across all species.
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account that higher levels of recruitment RP;ti result in higher harvests. Once
the US started experiencing a shortfall in her catches, Canadas highest landings
were 735 metric tons (in 2006); typically, however, Canada has been harvest-
ing around 400 metric tons (ICCAT (2010), Table 1). For the purposes of
the calibration, when Canada observes a low level of recruitment, he harvests
hP1 ;t(R
P








) = 710 metric tons.
Deriving the two shing prot functions (At for the US, and 
P
t for Canada),
has been the most challenging part of this exercise. The US prot function is




;t) =   hA;t   TCA(hA;t; RA;t), with 
denoting the ex-vessel price of bluen tuna, and TCA the USs harvest cost








P Canadas harvest cost function.
Notice that the price  of bluen tuna in the above shing prot functions is
xed, because more than half of the US catches, and about 80% of the Canadian
catches, are exported to the Japanese market. Western Atlantic Bluen tunas
are immediately gutted, upon landing, and either refrigerated or exported (in
crates lled with ice) within a few hours to Japan (NOAA (2008)). During
the period 1996-2001, the US was exporting approximately 85% of her bluen
tuna catches to Japan (some of them were re-exports from Mexico), but this
percentage decreased to 51% in 2009 (NOAA (2010)). The recent decrease in
the US exports may be the result of the reduced availability of bluen in the
US, and the development of a domestic market for high quality sushi. For the
purposes of the baseline calibrations, the market price of tuna  is set at $20 per
kg (about $9 per pound). In the US market, the average ex-vessel price per lb,
in 2009, was $7.09 in the North Atlantic, $9.40 in the Mid Atlantic, $11.43 in
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the South Atlantic, and $4.65 in the Gulf of Mexico (NOAA (2010), p. 128). In
practice, prices in the US vary across regions based on a number of factors, such
as the overall weight and quality of sh (e.g., freshness, fat content, method of
storage), the market supply, the consumer demand, the gear used to catch it,
and the Japanese Yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate.
Estimating the shing prot functions, is mainly a matter of retrieving the
total harvest cost functions (TCA and TCP ) from the available data. To this
end, relationships between Catch Per Unit of E¤ort (CPUE) and biomass are
constructed for both countries, by putting together information from di¤erent
sources. Figure 5 provides a graphical comparison of 4 di¤erent CPUE-Biomass
relationships constructed for the US81 ; while Figure 6 depicts 4 such relation-
ships for Canada82 . Once these 8 relationships were constructed, each of them
was solved for e¤ort (EA and EP ). The resulting expressions for e¤ort were then
replaced in the harvest cost functions TCA = A  EA, and TCP = P  EP ,
with Aand P the unit costs of shing e¤ort for the two countries. Fishing
prot functions for the US (based on TCA) are reported in Table 2, as specica-
tions K5-K8 (these specications are derived from the functional relationships
81Regarding the US biomass, two indices were constructed as weighted sums of Browns
(2007) original SMSM, LGSM and Giant BFT indices: the rst, assigned higher weights to
the smaller classes (40%, 40% and 20%); the second, equal weights to all classes.
Regarding the US CPUE, ICCATs on-line Task II c.e. dataset was employed. This dataset
gives catches of bluen by US vessel and by gear type; however, e¤ort (dened as shing hrs) is
not provided by each tuna species. Therefore, two time series for the CPUE were constructed:
one, by assuming that the percentage of e¤ort directed specically to Bluen tunas was the
same as the proportion of Bluen catches over the total Rod and Reel tuna catches; the other,
by assuming that all shing time was allocated to Bluen catches.
Using the time series (1993-2007) for the constructed biomass indices and CPUE, the rela-
tionships of Figure 5 were derived as follows:
A linear relationship was tted to the CPUE and biomass index data;
Using a known estimate for the USs biomass in a single year (2007), and rewriting the
value of the biomass index (for that year) as "biomass index=biomass*kappa", the value of
the parameter kappa was derived using the prediction of the tted line (for that year);
Applying the value of the parameter kappa across all years, the time series for the biomass
index was converted into a time series for biomass;
The CPUE data were plotted against the biomass data (not biomass index), yielding the
CPUE-Biomass relationships of Figure 5.
82Neilson et al. (2007) was the main source of information for generating these relationships.
The relationships of Figure 6 were derived by following steps similar to those in footnote 81.
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of Figure 583). Fishing prot functions for Canada (based on TCP ) are reported
in Table 2, as specications K1-K4 (derived from the functional relationships
of Figure 684). For the purposes of the baseline calibrations, the USs A unit
cost of shing e¤ort is set at $105 per shing hour85 ; and Canadas unit cost of
e¤ort is set slightly lower, at P = $90 per hour.
The US derives utility by harvesting the stock and receiving compensation
from Canada. For the purposes of the calibration, the square root utility func-
tion is employed; this function satises the risk averse requirement for the
Agents preferences. The disutility of regulatory e¤ort c(ti) is calculated as
a percentage (specically, 9%) of the USs foregone shing prots (when exert-
ing regulatory e¤ort)86 . The USs non-cooperative shing prots A;N:C:(Ft)
are simply her prots without exerting any e¤ort.
The growth of bluen tuna does not appear to be uniform throughout the
year; it is greatest from June through October, when the stock has migrated
in large numbers to Canada. During this time, adult sh may increase their
body mass by 15-40%, while feeding on high-energy prey (herring, mackerel
and bluesh). For the purposes of the calibration, the growth function g in
Canadas area takes the simple form g(SA;t) = 1:35  SA;t.
83Note that hA in Specications K5-K8 is postmultiplied by 1000 because hA in the prot
functions of Table 2 is measured in tons.
84Note that hP in Specications K1-K4 is postmultiplied by 1000 because hP in the prot
functions of Table 2 is measured in tons. Moreover, P in Specications K1-K4 is postmulti-
plied by 100 because P in the prot functions of Table 2 is measured in $=hr (while shing
e¤ort in the horizontal axis of Figure 6 was expressed in 100hrs).
85 In general, the cost of shing is a function of the provisions for each trip (hooks, bait, ice,
fuel, groceries), the vessel repairs, and the payment to the crew members (NOAA (2008)).
Nevertheless, "the available data do not allow the US National Marine Fisheries Service to
calculate the e¤ort and cost associated with each trip" (US Federal Register (2010), p.
30737). Therefore, the value used in the calibration was constructed based on information for
US charter boats in 2004 (NOAA (2010), p. 159).
86The disutility of regulatory e¤ort captures the cost of undertaking a conservation policy
in the US. The US administration does not announce a budget for enforcing any bluen tuna
regulations; therefore, c() is calculated through the opportunity cost of the bluen tuna
shery. (But even information for the USs budget was available, getting an estimate for c()
would be complicated: many tuna policies in the US are not directed specically to bluen;
most tuna permits are of "open access", i.e., allow the landing of all Atlantic tunas (including
bluen), sharks, swordsh and billsh.)
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ICCAT (2008) also ts a growth function (to the year-classes after 1970)
for the whole Western Atlantic stock. This function yields von Bertalan¤y
coe¢ cients K = 0:20; L1 = 257; and t0 = 0:83.87 For the purposes of the
calibration, the growth function F in the Adjacent High Sea takes ICCATs
(2008) von Bertalan¤y parameters.
For the last 13 years, since ICCAT initiated its 20-year Western Atlantic
Rebuilding Plan, the US experienced a shortfall in catches 5 times (2004-2008,
and 2010). Therefore, the frequency of shortfalls is about 0:38. For the purposes
of the baseline calibrations, the probability (1 ) that the random event occurs
is 0:35.
Finally, the exploitation rate of the stock in the Adjacent High Sea corre-
sponds to Japans historic quota allocation by ICCAT, i.e.,  = 0:17.
87Turner and Restrepos (1994) have also estimated a growth function for the whole stock,
with von Bertalan¤y coe¢ cients K = 0:08; L1 = 382; t0 =  0:71.
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3.4 Results of Empirical Calibration
The parameters and functional relationships of Table 2 are substituted into the
static maximization problem of Section 2.3.1. Table 2 contains di¤erent Spec-
ications for the shing prot functions (i.e., Specications K5-K8 for the US,
and K1-K4 for Canada); therefore, maximization is performed for all possible
combinations of these Specications. The results generated by these Specica-
tions, called baseline calibrations, are presented in Tables 3-11 (note that these
Tables do not report results for Specication 8, because Specication 8 is very
similar to Specication 7). All results are obtained in Mathematica 7 88 .
The way to read Tables 3-11 is the following: the third column of each
Table gives the amount of compensation for the levels of the observable output
(i.e., for Canadas recruitment). In the simplest setting of the theoretical model
(adopted also in the calibration), the observable output takes only three values:
low, medium, or high. These values are the result of the interaction of the
Agents regulatory e¤ort with the States of Nature. The Agent, for simplicity,
makes a choice between two levels of regulatory e¤ort (rst column of Tables
3-11): low e¤ort 1, or high e¤ort 2. Therefore, the upper half part of Tables
3-11 gives the solutions of the problem in which the Principal (i.e., Canada)
induces low e¤ort from the Agent (the US); while the lower half presents the
solutions of the problem with high e¤ort. The Principals expected payo¤s, or
maximum value functions V1 and V2, are given in the last column of each Table.
Tables 3-5 report the results of the baseline calibrations when Canadas
shing prot function is given by Specication K5 (for various Specications of
the USs prot function). Instead, Tables 6-8, use Specication K6 for Canada;
and Tables 9-11, Specication K7.
88 In order to solve the maximization problem in Mathematica, a linear transformation of
the inequality constraints is rst required.
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The results from all Specications are qualitatively similar in terms of the
maximum value functions: a higher expected payo¤ is calculated in the high
(2), than in the low (1) e¤ort problem, i.e. V2 > V1. This means that the
Principal is better o¤ by o¤ering a contract which induces high than low e¤ort
from the Agent. The estimated level of compensation for the high-e¤ort contract
is non decreasing in the medium and high outputs, and the level of compensation
is approximately the same in all Tables: 1:38106 (Tables 3-5), 1:39106 (Tables
6-8), and 1:25  106 (Tables 9-11). Finding the same values for compensation in
Tables 3-8 is not a surprise, because specications K5 and K6 were constructed
based on similar CPUE-Biomass relationships; while specication K7 used a
di¤erent biomass index. Moreover, Canadas expected payo¤s by inducing high
e¤ort from the Agent range between $US5 10 million (V2 varies from 5:03106
to 10:06106, with Specication K7 generating the highest values (Tables 9-11)).
The results of these baseline calibrations were derived under specic model
parameterizations. To examine the robustness of the nding V2 > V1, the
maximization problems (for Specications K5 and K1; K6 and K2; K7 and
K4) are repeated for alternate values of parameters: a sensitivity analysis is
performed for  (i.e., the probability that no random event occurs), the Agents
unit cost of shing (i.e., parameter A in Table 2), and the market price of tuna
(i.e., parameter  in Table 2). The results are drawn in Figures 7-9, 10-12, and
13-15, respectively.
Comparing Figures 7-15, the Principals maximum value function89 varies
substantially with the market price of tuna (from $0:11 to 13 million); mod-
erately with the probability  (less steep curves in Figures 7-9); and remains
approximately the same for various levels of the USs unit cost of shing (in
Figure 10, V2 varies between $4:95 and $5:03 million; in Figure 11, it is around
89V2 denotes his expected payo¤s when he induces high e¤ort; and V1 when he induces low
e¤ort.
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$8:4 million; and in Figure 12, around $9:9 million).
Comparing Figures 7-9, the conclusion that the Principal is better o¤ by
inducing high (instead of low) e¤ort from the Agent, holds for a large range of
s. The critical value of , above which V2 becomes smaller than V1, is 0:71 (in
Figure 7); 0:86 (in Figure 8), and 0:93 (in Figure 9). It seems safe to argue that
for  6 0:7, V2 is expected to be larger than V1 ( was set at 0:65 in the baseline
calibrations of Tables 3-11).
Comparing Figures 10-12, the inequality V2 > V1 holds again for various
values of the Agents shing unit cost. Even when the USs shing cost A
drops down (from the baseline value of 105$=hr) to 5$=hr, the Principal is still
better o¤ by exerting high e¤ort from the Agent (Figures 11 and 12). The
critical value, in Figure 10, below which V2 < V1, is 38. Nevertheless, it is
unlikely that the USs shing unit cost takes such a small value for the US and
Canada use similar shing technology, and the USs parameter A cannot be
signicantly di¤erent from Canadas value P = 90.
Finally, the conclusion V2 > V1 is quite robust also for changes in the market
price of tuna. The inequality is reversed only when the market price falls below
4$=kg (Figure 15), or below 9$=kg (Figure 14), or below 18$=kg (Figure 13).
The value in the baseline calibrations of Tables 3-11 was set at 20$=kg.
Overall, the empirical calibration is subject to the usual data limitations and
functional specication errors. In this empirical exercise, harvest (production)
functions were not properly estimated, and the disutility of e¤ort (c(i)) was
chosen with a degree of arbitrariness (for no information regarding the cost of
implementing regulations in the bluen tuna shery was available). Moreover,
constructing shing prot functions, for either country, involved a signicant
amount of guesswork (in essence, bringing together di¤erent sources of informa-
tion with a view to to deriving CPUE-Biomass relationships). The main purpose
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of the calibration was to consider the assumptions and limitations of the pro-
posed theoretical model (when trying to project it to a real world setting), and
also to raise the use of side payments in the bluen tuna shery.
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4 Concluding Remarks
My thesis proposes a theoretical framework, in the context of mechanism de-
sign, for modeling sheries agreements with side payments. It also sets up a
calibration exercise with parameters inspired by the Western Atlantic Bluen
Tuna shery.
The theoretical framework examines the extent to which one country (the
Agent) responds (i.e., preserves a shared stock) to side payments o¤ered by
another country (the Principal). First order conditions for the second best
contracts are derived in a static and dynamic setting. The analogue of the Mar-
tingale Property, from nance literature, is derived in the context of sheries.
Though side payments have not received much attention yet, quota transfer-
ring is now a policy alternative in the management of the Pacic Salmon, and
the Atlantic Tunas. The proposed analysis does not introduce any extra enforce-
ment costs (i.e., other than those already incurring within Regional Fisheries
Management Organizations) for the Agents action remains hidden throughout
each shing season. Moreover, policy makers and shers may welcome this
type of cooperative management more than reciprocal harvesting (the latter is
typically viewed as a bribery through which foreigners are granted access into
another countrys territory). Compensation here, instead, induces the Agent to
harvest less extensively, keeping nonetheless her right to exclusively operate in
her own area.
In the context of the Western Atlantic Bluen Tuna, Canadas expected
payo¤s by proposing this mechanism to the US, range between $US5 10million.
The results of the calibration should be evaluated keeping in mind the data
limitations and functional specication errors. Calibrated models are numerical
models without a complete econometric formulation. Better approximations for
the countriesprot and production functions may provide better estimates.
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Appendix A:
The Optimal Continuation Contract for Two Periods
In practice, shing nations renege on agreements and renegotiate over time.
Consider the two-period setting of the dynamic contract in Section 2.3.2, but
relax the assumption of full commitment: Country A now reneges on the optimal
long term contract, in period t = 1, and exerts e¤ort 1i 6= 1. Following the
realization of RP;1i (at the end of period t = 1), P o¤ers a new continuation
contract to replace the initial long-term contract. The continuation contract
has to be mutually benecial for the two parties.
The optimal continuation contract is a spot contract, i.e., species the sec-









function of the observable output in that period only. The di¤erence between
this contract and the second period spot contract of Section 2.3.2 is the right
hand side of the individual rationality constraint. Below, the right hand side of
the (cIR) is written for the optimal values () of the contract in Section 2.3.2.
The optimal continuation contract with no discounting, and assuming that P
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The Innitely Repeated Contract
So far, the relation between the contracting parties has been nite. Appendix
B relaxes this assumption. The repeated nature of the transaction makes the
agreement below Self-Enforcing.
Some intuition for capturing the Self-Enforcing nature of the agreement is
drawn by the Relational Contracts literature (Telser (1980), Klein and Le­ er
(1981), Bull (1987), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), MacLeod (2003, 2007),
Baker (1992) and Baker et al. (1994, 2002)). In this literature, a Self-Enforcing
employment contract is sustained by the use of credible threats. The reason
why threats are credible, is that the contracting parties are expected to interact
innitely over time. Indeed, in sheries, the transaction is a repeated one; sh
reproduce over time.
Based on the literature on relational contracts under asymmetric informa-
tion, the optimal Self Enforcing contract is a perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the
innite horizon game. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the partiesstrategies
(As strategy is her action t; Ps strategy is the recruitment-contingent com-
pensation wt), following any history of output realizations and any history of
past payments, are best responses. MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) have shown
that non-stationary allocations cannot improve on stationary ones. This means
that an e¢ cient incentive compatible allocation involves A taking a constant
action over time, and P paying a constant compensation over time.
In the setting of Section 2.1, the optimal stationary contract maximizes the
joint surplus from the agreement, and is the solution of the following dynamic
programming problem90 :

























the Incentive Compatibility Constraint (IC)
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with  denoting the common discount factor; E the expectation operator
(with respect to RP ); s
 the joint surplus from the optimal contract in some
time period; sA As share of the joint surplus s (thus, (s   sA) denotes
Ps share); sA and sP As and Ps non-cooperative payo¤s respectively. The
solution of this model will depend on the non-cooperative payo¤s sA and sP
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 Figure 2: Side Payments in the Stochastic Sequential Fishery 
A’s EEZ       P’s EEZ       AHS 








t Rh ,, *    
 A harvests        )( ,
P
t t
Rw     
DW FNs harvest 




t RFSF 1,1,, )(     
                                  
A
tR ,    








t RhRS            
A receives 
  A’s biomass              
                  Stock    growth          )( ,,
PP
t t
Rh   
 No random event      P harvests  
  (θ)    PA
t t






t RRhRS tt ,,,,, )(     
               
Biomass  
A
tR ,    
                           
Random event    PA
t t






t RRhRS tt ,1,1,1,1,1 )(     
        (1-θ)       P harvests  
                   
 
            Stock    growth          )( ,1,1
PP
t t
Rh    
          A’s biomass                         A receives  
A
tR ,1 
             P receives 








t RhRS   




t RFSF 1,1,1,1 )(   
 
  A harvests                 P pays    DWFNs  harvest
      
               




t Rh    
     )( ,1
P
t t




t Rh ,1,1 *          
             
  
      




Figure 3: ICCAT’s Convention Area for Bluefin Tuna (separated in West and East 





Figure 4: Historical Catches of Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna (ATW) in 
comparison to Total Allowable Catches (TAC) set by ICCAT 




Figure 5: CPUE-Biomass Relationships for the US Bluefin Tuna fishery 
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Figure 6: CPUE-Biomass Relationships for the Canadian Bluefin Tuna fishery 
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Figure 7: Sensitivity Analysis: K5 and K1 Specifications for alternate values of θ  
 
 
Figure 8: Sensitivity Analysis: K6 and K2 Specifications for alternate values of θ  
 
 





Figure 10: Sensitivity Analysis: K5 and K1 Specifications for alternate values of the 
US’s fishing unit cost 
 
 
Figure 11: Sensitivity Analysis: K6 and K2 Specifications for alternate values of the 
US’s fishing unit cost 
 
 
Figure 12: Sensitivity Analysis: K7 and K4 Specifications for alternate values of the 





Figure 13: Sensitivity Analysis: K5 and K1 Specifications for alternate values of 
tuna’s market price  
 
 
Figure 14: Sensitivity Analysis: K6 and K2 Specifications for alternate values of 
tuna’s market price  
 
 
Figure 15: Sensitivity Analysis: K7 and K4 Specifications for alternate values of 




Table 1: Main International Fisheries Organizations by type of policy arrangement 
(Abundance-based catch limits, or Reciprocal harvesting) 
 
 Abundance-based catch limits Reciprocal Harvesting 
Atlantic 
Ocean 
International Commission for the 
Conservation of the Atlantic 
Tunas 
1997 EU-Faroe Islands Atlanto-
Scandian Herring Agreement 
North Atlantic Salmon 
Conservation Organization 
1998 EU-Mozambique Tuna 
Agreement 
North Atlantic Fishery 
Organization 
2001 EU-Mauritania Cephalopods and 
Tuna Agreement 
2006 EU-Norway North Sea 
Stocks Agreement (Cod, 
Haddock, Saithe, Place, Mackerel, 
Herring) 
2004 EU-Guinea Cephalopods and 
Shrimp Agreement 
2004 EU-Madagascar Tuna Agreement 
2005 EU-Cape Verde Tuna Agreement 
2005 EU-Gabon Tuna Agreement 
2005 EU-Morocco Tuna Agreement 
2005 EU-Norway Blue Whiting 
Agreement 
2006 EU-Norway Spring-spawning 
Herring Agreement 
2006 EU-Russia Baltic Sea Stocks 
Agreement (Cod, Salmon, Sprat, 
Herring) 
2007 EU-Faroe Islands Blue Whiting 
Agreement 
2007 EU-Greenland Halibut, Shrimp, 
Redfish Agreement 
2007 EU-Ivory Coast Tuna Agreement 
Pacific 
Ocean 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission 
2002 US-Canada Pacific Albacore 
Tuna Agreement 
 International Pacific Halibut 
Commission 
2003 US-Pacific Islands Tuna 
Agreement 
 North Pacific Anadromous Fish 
Commission 
 Pacific Salmon Commission 
 Commission for the Conservation 
of the Southern Bluefin Tuna 





Commission for the Conservation 





Table 2: Summary of Parameters and Functional Relationships for the Empirical 




Empirical Value for Calibration 
Initial stock 
biomass  
1tF =5940 tons 
A’s recruitment  A
tR , =5940 tons 
A
tR ,1  =5346 tons 



















t Rh   =660 tons 


























































A $105  
A’s utility Square root function 
A’s disutility )_(*09.0)( profitsforegonec ti   
A’s non cooperative 
fishing profits 
profitsforegoneFt
CNA _)(..,   
Stock’s growth 
function in P’s area 
AA SSg *35.1)(   



















t Rh  =710 tons 
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P $90  
Probability of 
random event 
35.01   




function in the AHS 






















Table 3: Results of baseline calibration with K5 and K1 Specifications 
 





Low  236  
1V =4.96*10


















Table 4: Results of baseline calibration with K5 and K2 Specifications 
 





Low  236  
1V =7.94*10
6
 Medium 236 
High 317 
 














Table 5: Results of baseline calibration with K5 and K3 Specifications 
 
A’s effort Observable Output Compensation ($) Maximum Value 
Function ($) 
 
Low ( 1 ) 
Low  236  
1V =7.72*10
6
 Medium 236 
High 317 
 


























Table 6: Results of baseline calibration with K6 and K1 Specifications 
 





Low  235  
1V =4.96*10
6


















Table 7: Results of baseline calibration with K6 and K2 Specifications 
 





Low  235  
1V =7.94*10
6
 Medium 235 
High 811 
 














Table 8: Results of baseline calibration with K6 and K4 Specifications 
 
A’s effort Observable Output Compensation ($) Maximum Value 
Function ($) 
 
Low ( 1 ) 
Low  235  
1V =9.21*10
6
 Medium 235 
High 811 
 


























Table 9: Results of baseline calibration with K7 and K2 Specifications 
 





Low  215  
1V =7.94*10
6


















Table 10: Results of baseline calibration with K7 and K3 Specifications 
 





Low  215  
1V =7.72*10
6
 Medium 215 
High 203 
 














Table 11: Results of baseline calibration with K7 and K4 Specifications 
A’s effort Observable Output Compensation ($) Maximum Value 
Function ($) 
 
Low ( 1 ) 
Low  215  
1V =9.21*10
6
 Medium 215 
High 203 
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